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EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE HOME
AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM IN
RESPONSE TO THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS: WHY
REAL ESTATE SECURITIZATION DEMANDS A
NEW APPROACH
John Kinney
INTRODUCTION

This case presents an unfortunate, but all too common
set of circumstances in the world today. Plaintiff is a
homeowner in financial distress who seeks a loan
modification from an unresponsive bank relying on an
ineffectual federal program.
This statement, by Magistrate Lois Bloom in Rivera v. Bank of
America, best captures the utter frustration felt by financially
distressed homeowners and sympathetic judges regarding the
government's failed efforts to stem the foreclosure crisis. Heard
countless times in thousands of courtrooms across the country in the
aftermath of the 2008 global financial meltdown, Magistrate Bloom
expressed what seemed deliberate efforts by banks and government
officials to impede implementation of the federal Home Affordable
2014 J.D. Candidate, University of the District of Columbia David A.
Clarke School of Law. The views and opinions expressed here are exclusively those
of the author and do not reflect those of his employer, school or any other
affiliation. The author, as the Symposium Editor of the U.D.C. Law Review, is
grateful to Professor Crisarla Houston for forwarding the draft of this paper to the
Editorial Board as a candidate for publication, and to Professor Wilhelmina ReubenCooke for affording him the opportunity to present his ideas to her Property
class. The author is also grateful to the Law Review Editorial Board, Senior Editors,
and Associate Editors for their assistance throughout the editing process.
1 Rivera v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 09 CV 2450 LB, 2011 WL 1533474, 1
(E.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011).
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Mortgage Program ("HAMP"). 2 The United States Treasury
Department's ("Treasury") HAMP program, created pursuant to the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act ("EESA") of 2008, encourages
banks to make monthly mortgage payments more affordable for
homeowners at possible risk of foreclosure. 3 (The process of reducing
monthly payments is called "loan modification."). Policy experts
believe that HAMP-authorized loan modification allows homeowners
to stay in their homes, thus halting the foreclosure crisis that helped
cause the Great Recession and exacerbated the Great Unwinding of
the late 2000s, from which the American economy is still recovering.s
Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Sec'y Tim Geithner
Outlines Comprehensive Fin. Stability Plan (Feb. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Tim
Geithner Outlines Stability Plan]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Relief for
Responsible Homeowners: Treasury Announces Requirements for Making Home
Affordable Program (Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Relief for Responsible
Homeowners]. See also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Obama
Administration Extends Application Deadline for the Making Home Affordable
Program: Extension through December 2015 Will Provide Struggling Homeowners
Additional Time to Access Sustainable Mortgage Relief and Align End Dates for
Key Assistance Programs (May 30, 2013) (Treasury extends HAMP and all
foreclosure relief programs through Dec. 31, 2015).
3 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)
(hereinafter EESA of 2008] (the EESA of 2008 is commonly known as the Troubled
Assets Relief Program ("TARP"), which authorized Treasury to adopt measures to
halt the liquidity and credit crisis gripping the global economy in September 2008,
including the creation of foreclosure prevention programs such as HAMP).
2

4 CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY,
HIGH ROLLERS, AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 107 (2008) (using the phrase "The

Great Unwinding" to describe the fall 2008 financial meltdown). Regarding the
belief by policy makers that halting the foreclosure crisis would contribute to
financial stability, see Letter from Rep. Dennis Kucinich, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Domestic Policy, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to
Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services, (Nov. 17,
2008) (on file with the author). ("When the magnitude of the subprime and Alt-A
mortgage crisis threatened the entire financial system, you led Congressional efforts
in negotiating and drafting the [EESA] to achieve the twin objectives of unfreezing
capital markets and preventing unnecessary foreclosures....Giving the Department of
Treasury broad latitude, EESA nonetheless explicitly authorized the purchase of
troubled mortgage assets by the [TARP], to be accompanied by a plan to minimize
foreclosures on those properties. Unfortunately, the Department of Treasury has not
exercised its authority properly."); 155 Cong. Rec. H188 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2009)
(Statement of Rep. Kaptur) ("TARP isn't working. It hasn't stemmed
the foreclosure crisis, which is at the heart of what is wrong with our economy.").
5 Testimony of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, Meeting
with the Budget Conference Committee, Federal News Service (Nov. 13, 2013)
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This Note argues that for reasons suggested by Magistrate Bloom
in Rivera - an unresponsive bank industry and ineffectual government
program management - HAMP failed to achieve the goal of stemming
the foreclosure crisis. Scholarship in this area strongly supports the
idea that mortgage loan modification programs are ineffective because
of structural bias in the modern system of real estate finance that tends
to favor foreclosure over loan modification. 6 This Note focuses on: 1)
Treasury's failure to design and enforce HAMP in a way that
sufficiently neutralizes structural bias in the loan modification process;
and 2) policy alternatives Congress should consider that would better
effectuate the goal of reducing foreclosures through loan modification.
First, as shown in Section II, despite Congress' mandate in fall
2008 that Treasury administer comprehensive federal foreclosure
prevention programs such as HAMP, the program fell short of its
objectives because Treasury did not properly design or enforce the
HAMP program. In designing and administering the program,
Treasury overlooked or consciously ignored how the securitized
system of mortgage finance creates market incentives contrary to the
goal of loan modification. Specifically, Treasury failed to overcome
the inherent bias in the mortgage loan bank "servicing" industry that,
according to some, tends to favor foreclosure over loan modification,
and did not enforce what borrowers construe as servicers' contractual

("The primary cause of the [current] distress in the labor market is a shortfall in the
demand for goods and services relative to the productive capacity of the economy
and therefore in the demand for workers. The primary reason why demand is weak is
the lingering effects of the housing bubble and financial crisis....").
6 See Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the
Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1257 (2009); Diane E. Thompson, Why
Servicers Foreclose When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles of Servicer
Behavior, National Consumer Law Center (October 2009) [hereinafter WHY
SERVICERS FORECLOSE], http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-servicersmodify.pdf; Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer
Incentives DiscourageLoan Modifications, 86 WASH L. REV. 755 (2011) [hereinafter
ForeclosingModifications]; Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing,
28 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2011). These authorities suggest that the modem, securitizedbased system of mortgage finance creates misaligned incentives between servicers
who service residential mortgages on the one hand, and beneficial investors of the
mortgages on the other. These incentives are a natural by-product of securitized
finance, with servicers and investors merely acting in their own self-interest. The
impact of the modem securitization-based model of mortgage finance in the U.S. is
discussed in greater in detail in Section 11 B, infra.
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obligations to homeowners created by HAMP's guidelines. 7 Rather
than getting servicers to alter their behavior by penalizing them for
conduct inconsistent with those guidelines, as described in Section II
D, Treasury allowed servicers to exercise unimpeded discretion to
deny loan modification requests pursuant to an autonomous, insulated
decision-making process devoid of disclosure, transparency, and
accountability. Treasury's persistent refusal to establish meaningful
complaint, appeals, or dispute resolution mechanisms for aggrieved
borrowers allowed servicers to deny loan modifications without
effective government oversight.8
Second, frustrated by HAMP's administrative deficiencies, at-risk
borrowers were left to challenge adverse loan modification
determinations by servicers in the courts on a case-by-case basis.' As
shown in Section II E, Treasury's reluctance to enforce HAMP's
administrative guidelines, narrow judicial construction of HAMP's
enabling statute, and possible misapplication of the federal preemption
doctrine to HAMP left borrowers without standing to enforce what
they perceive as servicers'
contractual obligations under
congressionally-authorized and federally-created HAMP guidelines. 10
Although courts construe HAMP's enabling statute as barring a private
cause of action by borrowers against servicers for purported noncompliance with Treasury guidelines, the 7th Circuit decision in
Wigod v. Wells Fargo questioned application of federal preemption
principles to HAMP cases." Before Wigod, the federal preemption
doctrine had been invoked to dismiss lawsuits based on alleged

7 See infra Section 11 A (the term loan "servicers" refers to banks that collect
monthly mortgage payments on behalf of the "owner" of the mortgage loan, e.g.,
private investors or government guaranty agencies, which purchase loans from
mortgage "loan originators." Even though servicers are not the beneficial owners of
the loan, they are responsible for determining whether to modify or foreclose on
delinquent loans. Additionally, although servicers' decision to modify or foreclose is
theoretically based on which is most profitable - or least costly - for the beneficial
loan investor/owners, servicers' financial self-interest may predispose them to
foreclosure).
8 See infra Section II C.
9 See infra Section II E.
o0Id.

" Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 577 (7th Cir. 2012). For
discussion of cases that construe HAMP's enabling statute as barring a private right
of action by borrowers, see Section II E, infra.
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servicer violations of purely state-based common law duties arising in
connection with the federal HAMP loan modification process.' 2
Nevertheless, even if adopted by all federal circuits, Wigod's
practical effect on the national foreclosure crisis is negligible because
alleged improper HAMP loan modification denials would have to be
litigated on a case-by-case basis. Such a time consuming,
individualized approach to HAMP loan modifications is inconsistent
with the scope of action envisioned by Congress. As shown in Section
II B, Congress authorized Treasury to create comprehensive programs
to systemically address preventable foreclosures.
Third, the combined effect of structural bias in the loan
modification process, ineffective Treasury program design and
enforcement, and lack of judicial standing to enforce servicers'
purported obligations under HAMP placed at-risk borrowers in legal
purgatory. A federal program intended to comprehensively stem the
foreclosure crisis was not enforced by the responsible government
agency with power to do so, and could not be judicially enforced by
borrowers for whose benefit HAMP was apparently created. Because
of HAMP's deficiencies, Section III of this Note argues that policy
makers should consider a new approach to foreclosure prevention
initiatives that comprehensively address barriers to loan modification
caused by the misalignment of incentives brought about by the modern
system of securitized mortgage finance. The purpose of this alternative
approach is to create greater balance in the loan modification decisionmaking process by placing exclusive responsibility for decisions in the
hands of neutral third parties, taking into account the broader
congressional purpose of loan modification and the competing claims
of stakeholders involved in the loan modification process.
I. BACKGROUND
Id. For a discussion of cases before Wigod holding that HAMP's enabling
statute preempts borrowers' state-based common law claims arising in connection
with HAMP, see Section II E, infra.
13 See infra Section III. (There are two variations of this approach: 1) The
Foreclosure Triage proposal would create a dedicated foreclosure/loan modification
court overseen by bankruptcy magistrates charged with evaluating the suitability of
the loan for modification based on the respective views of the borrower, the servicer,
and investor; and 2) The Blind Trustee proposal would create federally appointed
loan modification decision-making panels made up of private sector experts who
make loan modification determinations without knowing the identify or viewpoint of
the particular servicer or investor).
12
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A. Foreclosure'sRole in the Global Economic Crisis of 2007-2008

This section argues that HAMP is a direct by-product of the federal
government's effort to alleviate the causes and conditions of the Great
Recession and financial crisis afflicting the global economy in fall
2008. Because economists at the time believed the principal cause of
the global financial crisis was the collapse of American housing
market and the opaque financial instruments linked to that market,
mitigating the foreclosure crisis that depressed property values was
considered an indispensable component to stabilizing the' global
economy. 14

Foreclosure prevention initiatives such as HAMP were believed
critical to alleviating the crisis because of the complex relationship
among mortgage loans, real estate prices, and the financial instruments
held by banks and investors.' 5 First, by the late 2000s, global private
investors held billions of dollars in so-called "collateralized mortgage
obligations" ("CMOs"), commonly known as "residential mortgage
backed securities" ("RMBS").1 6 The value of residential mortgage
14 MORRIS, supra note 4, at 65-85; see also 155 Cong. Rec. E171 (daily ed.
Feb. 2, 2009) (Statement of Rep. Holt) ("the mortgage foreclosure crisis... is central
to the broader economic crisis."); 155 Cong. Rec. H188 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2009)
(Statement of Rep. Kaptur) ("TARP isn't working. It hasn't stemmed
the foreclosure crisis, which is at the heart of what is wrong with our economy.")
15 MORRIS, supra note 4, at 78; 155 Cong. Rec. H188 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2009)
(Statement of Rep. Kaptur).
16 MORRIS, supra note 4, at 65-85 (RMBS owned by private investors are
usually linked to lower quality "subprime" mortgages with relaxed originating and
underwriting standards sold by mortgage originators and placed in so-called "private
label non-agency securitization trusts" marketed by banks/investment houses to
private and institutional investors. HAMP exclusively addresses mortgages that back
these private label non-agency RMBS. In contrast to the non-agency private label
variety, RMBS issued, sold, and guaranteed by the two "Government Sponsored
Enterprises" (GSEs) - Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") - are called
"agency" RMBS. GSE-issued and guaranteed RMBS are backed by comparatively
higher quality mortgages that comply with the GSEs' origination and underwriting
standards. The GSEs, regulated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA),
operate their own loan modification program separate and independent of the
Treasury-run HAMP.). For discussion of differences between GSE-held "agency"
RMBS and private-label "non-agency" RMBS held in securitization trusts, See
generally Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-LabelMortgage-Backed Securities,
61 FLA. L. REV. 827 (2009).
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backed securities is tied directly to both the value of the underlying
property that secures the mortgage and the borrower's ability to make
monthly mortgage payments needed to avoid foreclosure. On the eve
of the financial crisis in the late 2000s, eighty percent of all
collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") held worldwide consisted of
RMBS, almost all of them linked to mortgages originated in the United
States.' 8 Hence, billions of dollars of financial instruments held
worldwide by private investors, banks, sovereign wealth funds, 401ks,
mutual funds, and pension funds all came to depend on the ability of
the average American homeowner to maintain monthly mortgage
payments and to avoid foreclosure.19
17ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 763 ("Investors who purchase
the bonds do not own the loans, but they do own the right to receive payment based
on the loan payments."); Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: PredatoryLending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503,
544-45 (2002) [hereinafter Held Up in Due Course] (the value of the RMBS depends
on the amount of equity securing the loan). Each individual RMBS is only as
valuable as the homeowner's ability to pay the monthly mortgage or, in the case of
borrower default on the mortgage payment, the value of the property that secures the
mortgage at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Alex M. Johnson, Preventing a
Return Engagement: Eliminating the Mortgage Purchasers' Status as a Holder in
Due Course: ProperlyAligning Incentives Among the Parties, 37 PEPP. L. REv. 529,
533-34 (2010) ("Purchasing assignees believe that the notes they are purchasing on
the secondary market are secured by two bifurcated assets: the security interest in the
land represented by the mortgage, and the stream of payments represented by the
amounts due and payable via the note executed by the mortgagor."). The downward
ripple effect of increased foreclosure rates on the value of surrounding properties
securing the mortgages to which investor-held RMBSs are linked - and the inability
of distressed borrowers to refinance or modify their "underwater" properties impairs the market value of the investor-held RMBS, thus triggering the global selloff of RMBS and related financial instruments. MORRIS, supra note 4, at 127-33. For
the impact of foreclosure rates on communities, see generally Lea Deutsch,
CollateralDamage: Mitigating the Effects of Foreclosurein Communities, 22 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 203 (Fall 2012).
18 MORRIS, supra note 4, at 78 ("in. the boom years of 2005 and 2006,
probably 80 percent of the securities in [Collateral Debt Obligations] were mortgagebacked, possibly 70 percent of those were below top-grade, and at least half were
subprime or second-line home equity lines...." CDOs generically refer to securities
collateralized by some type of liquid asset. CMO/RMBS,. which are securities
collateralized by mortgages secured by underlying "liquid" real estate, are a subset of
CDOs. "CDOs... became the generic name for all types of securitized assets,
including mortgages.").
19 Id. at 72 (noting that although only 15% to 20% of all American home
borrowers held subprime mortgages in 2007, a high rate of delinquencies by this
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Second, the bursting of the American housing bubble in 2006-2007
started the global run on RMBS and related financial instruments, a
trend that accelerated with the liquidation of Bear Steams in March
2008 and reached crisis proportions with the Lehman Brothers'
bankruptcy filing less than six months later. 20 This run fueled the
Great Unwinding that impaired the liquidity of the U.S. and global
financial markets. 2 ' With real estate prices now in steep decline,
RMBS and related financial instruments became increasingly
worthless and investors were unable to dump their "junk" holdings on
a saturated market that no longer had willing buyers. 22 Credit markets
froze, lending stopped, business expansion halted, unemployment rose,
affected homeowners could not make ends meet, and mortgage
delinquencies and foreclosures rose, thus further depressing real estate
prices that had triggered the crisis in the first place. 2
Because the value of property securing mortgages affects the value
of investor-held RMBS tied to those mortgages, policy makers
believed the global financial crisis could be partly halted by stemming
the tide of residential foreclosures. 24 According to this theory,
mortgage foreclosures impair the value of residential property used to
secure mortgages that prop up increasingly worthless investor-held
RMBS. By removing the cyclical downward pressure on real estate
prices caused by increased foreclosure rates, policy makers believed
the price of investor-held RMBS and related financial instruments
group would be "devastating" because of "the way lower-quality mortgages have
marbled their way through the entire world's credit system....").

Id. at ch. 6.; Allan Sloan, The financial meltdown's unhappy anniversary:
The crisis that began with the Bear Stearns debacle is about to enter year three.
20

Yecch, CNN MONEY, May 15, 2009.
21

Id.; Markus K. Brunnermeier, Decipheringthe Liquidity and Credit Crunch

2007-08, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 14612 (Dec. 2008)
at 29. ("An increase in mortgage delinquencies due to a nationwide decline in
housing prices was the trigger for a full-blown liquidity crisis that emerged in
2007....").
22 MORRIS, supra note 4, at ch. 6.
23 Id.
24 Martin

Feldstein, The Global Impact ofAmerica's Housing Crisis,PROJECT

Aug. 2009 ("The bursting of America's housing bubble in the summer
of 2006 triggered the global financial crisis and recession.... The fall in house prices
also led to a sharp rise in mortgage defaults and foreclosures, which has increased
the supply of homes on the market and caused house prices to fall further....And, if
the downward spiral in house prices continues, the value of mortgage-backed
securities held by financial institutions around the world will continue to decline,
affecting the supply of credit far beyond the US.").
SYNDICATE,
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could be stabilized, thus alleviating the conditions causing the
financial crisis. 2 5
Hence, the theoretical basis of federal foreclosure mitigation
programs such as HAMP was simple: if struggling homeowners could
better afford their monthly mortgage payments and avert foreclosure,
the decline in home prices triggered by foreclosures would be halted.2 6
If the decline in home prices was halted, the value of investor-held
RMBS would stabilize, thus bringing an end to the conditions causing
the global sell off, frozen credit markets, and the Great Recession. 2 7
B. Under the Securitization Model ofReal Estate Mortgage Finance,
Loan "Servicers" Have Incentives to Prefer Foreclosureover Loan
Modification

The success of federal loan modification programs envisioned by
Congress in the EESA of 2008 rested on the assumption that the
mortgage loan bank servicing industry and RMBS investors would
cooperate in the effort. 2 8 Treasury, however, did little to overcome the
pervasive barriers to loan modification inherent in the contemporary
system of securitized residential mortgage loan origination and
servicing - a system that, according to some, creates natural incentives
for servicers to avoid loan modification, or at least certain types of
modification.29 The reason why HAMP did not attain the goal of
systemically reducing foreclosure via loan modification requires an
Id.

Congress understood the relationship between increased U.S.
foreclosure rates and global financial stability when it enacted HAMP's enabling
statute, TARP, as part of the EESA of 2008. See S. Rep. No. 110-514, at 2 (2008)
("The core of the current economic crisis is the record high level of foreclosures.
Until the foreclosure crisis is addressed, our economy will not recover... .As
mortgages are modified they turn from nonperforming to performing and therefore
clarify the value of the mortgage and the securities that are derived from it. Since the
underlying logic to the [EESA] is to reinvigorate the mortgage and credit markets,
anything that aids this price discovery process is a meaningful addition to the
proposal.")
25

26

Id.

Feldstein, supra note 24.
As described later, to make loan modification work in the securitizationbased model of mortgage finance, the cooperation of both servicers and investors of
RMBS linked to underlying mortgages is required.
29 ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 770-71 ("Where servicers do
make modifications, they primarily make modifications that benefit themselves
without regard to either investors or homeowners.").
27
28

252

understanding of how loan servicers acquired greater influence over
the foreclosure decision-making process and strong incentives against
modification. 3 0 Ultimately, as shown in Section II, in designing and
implementing HAMP, Treasury failed to assert greater control over the
foreclosure decision-making process needed to counter structural bias
against loan modification built into the securitized system of mortgage
finance.
Servicers acquired a dominant role in the foreclosure process due
to massive changes to the system of real estate mortgage finance in the
U.S. - from one based on the "privity of contract" model to one based
on the securitization model - during the last three decades of the 20th
Century. 3 1 The biggest change wrought by securitization is what
experts call the principal-agency problem: the direct financial conflict
between investors who "hold" the loan, and the third-party "servicers"
responsible for collecting and distributing monthly mortgage payments
to investors and, if necessary, instituting foreclosure proceedings on
the investors' behalf.32 Today, under the securitization model,
Eggert, supra note 6, at 1263-64 ("Securitization not only weakens loan
underwriting, but.... makes it more difficult for the poorly underwritten loans that do
go into default to be worked out, and for borrowers to avoid foreclosure by obtaining
a loan modification.").
See Christopher Peterson, Predatory StructuredFinance, 28 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2185, 2186-2213 (2007). I use the phrase "privity of contract" to describe the
traditional face-to-face, personal contractual relationship between lenders and
borrowers prior to the advent of securitization. The phrase should not be confused
with how it is used in property law to describe landlord-tenant law or the law of
covenants.
32 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 69; MORRIS, supra note 4, at 55-56.
The term "holder" to describe RMBS investors is not intended to have the same
meaning as used in the Uniform Commercial Code to describe a "holder in due
course." U.C.C. § 3-302 (2013). The RMBS investor's "beneficial interest" in a
borrower's mortgage takes the form of certificated securities issued from a
securitized trust containing a pool of hundreds of individual mortgages. Held Up in
Due Course, supra note 17, at 535-45. Some suggest that the U.C.C.'s holder in due
course doctrine applies to creators of securitized trusts and investors in residential
mortgage-backed securities issued by those trusts. See id. at 507 ("Conversely, the
holder in due course doctrine protects from risk the securitizers and investors who
purchase predatory loans, even though they are the very parties best able to close
down unscrupulous lenders."); id. at 535 ("Through securitization, investors have
been able to channel huge sums of money into the lending industry, purchasing the
beneficial interest in the loans produced. While they have often benefited from the
high interest loans produced by predatory lenders, these investors [as holders in due
course] have been too protected from bearing the risk of loss caused by the predatory
nature of those loans.").
30
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mortgage loan servicing companies are exclusively responsible for
determining whether a mortgage should be foreclosed, even though the
servicer is not liable for the costs associated with foreclosure actions
and is made whole for such costs by the mortgage loan investors who
hold the foreclosed mortgage note. 33 Hence, because servicers are
often insulated from the financial consequences of foreclosing on
loans owned by investors - and made whole by investors for the costs
of foreclosure - servicers' do not have strong disincentives against
foreclosure. 34
In contrast, traditional lenders in the privity model originated,
owned, and serviced the loans.35 Because these "unitary" bank
originators/servicers had an undivided beneficial ownership interest in
each loan they originated, owned, and serviced, they exclusively bore
the risks and benefits of a loan's performance and made the final
determination whether it was more profitable to modify or to foreclose
on a delinquent loan - a determination made today by third party

servicers. 36
The conflict between investors and servicers unique to the
securitization model is caused by differences in the way each receives
income from the individual home loan mortgage they respectively hold
and service.3 7 Some argue that servicers' income is enhanced by
foreclosing on non-performing loans or by approving particular types
3 Foreclosing Modifications, supra note 6, at 816 ("Once a foreclosure is
complete... servicers are entitled to receive their advances back [from investors].
Servicers' advances are taken off the top, in full, at the postforeclosure sale, before
investors receive anything. If advances of principal and interest payments remain
beyond the sale value, servicers can usually collect them directly from the trust's
bank account (or withhold them from payments to the trust)").
34 Id. at 767-68 ("The conflict between servicers' compensation and the
interests of investors, the beneficial owners of loans, depresses the number of loan
modifications made, and increases the number of foreclosures.").
3 Held Up in Due Course, supra note 17, at 560 ("Before the advent of
securitization, homeowners typically borrowed from their neighborhood banks,
which normally held the loans for their entire terms.").
36 ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 763 ("This unity of ownership,
with its concomitant transparency, has long since passed from the home mortgage
market."); see also Peterson, supra note 31, at 2186-2213 (regarding transition from
traditional method of real estate finance to contemporary securitization system);
Held Up in Due Course, supra note 17, at 560 ("While a borrower whose loan is
held by a traditional bank might have some success in convincing the bank to
restructure the loan, too much of this flexibility vanishes once the loan has been
securitized."); Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 11-12.
3 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 69-77.
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of loan modifications.38 Investors generally receive income from
monthly mortgage payments associated with a fully performing loan whether from interest, principal or prepayment penalties - but must
absorb all costs associated with foreclosure.39 Therefore, when
confronted by an at-risk mortgage, investors care only whether
monthly mortgage payments can be reduced through modification
without sacrificing the loan's long-term profitability. 4 0 If not, their
only remaining hope is that the foreclosure sale can compensate
investors for lost interest income while recouping the loaned principal,
the sunk servicing costs associated over the life of the loan, and the
costs of foreclosure.41
In contrast, servicer income is generally not dependent on monthly
mortgage payment streams (e.g., principal, interest, prepayment
penalties). Instead, servicer income largely derives from a monthly
percentage of the unpaid principal balance (UPB) of each individual
investor-owned mortgage (or percentage of collective unpaid principal
balances of all mortgages contained in the pooled mortgage

38 ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 770-71 ("Where servicers do
make modifications, they primarily make modifications that benefit themselves
without regard to either investors or homeowners.").
3 Held Up in Due Course, supra note 17, at 544-45. ("early repayment and,
to a lesser extent, foreclosure are the two greatest risks facing investors in securities
backed by pools of mortgages, assuming that the securitization process has
succeeded in divorcing the pools of mortgages from all risks caused by or associated
with the originators or poolers of the loan.").
40 Id. at 561 ("Reducing the amount of discretion any party has to alter the
terms of the borrower's loans or payment requirements may aid investors and
improve the liquidity of the loan pool, but it can also force a trustee [or servicer] to
foreclose where a traditional lender might merely have restructured the loan,
possibly even to the traditional lender's benefit. In effect, the securitization process
erects a wall between the borrowers and the beneficial owners of the note, preventing
them from working out mutually advantageous changes to the terms of the note.").
41 Id. at 544-45 (Whether or not a foreclosure results in a net cost to the
[securitized trust] depends on the amount of equity securing the loan being
foreclosed... .If the loan had a high loan-to-value ratio (LTV), a large loan given the
value of the property securing the loan, perhaps because of a decline in the value of
the property, then the costs of the foreclosure process, which can be sizeable, can
consume the remaining equity and even cause a loss to the [trust] and thus to the
investors... .On the other hand, if the amount of the loan is far less than the value of
the property securing it, the investors could actually make money on the foreclosure
process, since the holder of the loan is often the sole bidder during the foreclosure
sale and typically bids only the amount of the outstanding balance on the loan.").
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securitization trust).42 Under servicer-investor Pooling and Service
contracts, servicers are fully reimbursed by investors for foreclosure
costs, late fees, and advances made by servicers to investors during the
period for which the loan is delinquent. 43 Servicer income is generally
unaffected by loan modifications achieved by reduced monthly
mortgage interest payments because the UPB is untouched, but
servicers gain from loan modifications achieved by "capitalizing
arrears" and "principal forbearance" because the UPB increases over
the long-term. 44 However, servicers are negatively affected by loan
modifications achieved through principal reductions - the most
effective loan modification method for averting foreclosure - because
the UPB decreases. 4 5 Therefore, when confronted with an at-risk
mortgage, servicers rarely consider the most effective loan
modification method for avoiding foreclosure despite its benefit to
investors and borrowers. 4 6
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 37 ("Servicers receive a percentage of
the outstanding unpaid principal balance ("UPB") in the trust as a servicing fee. Each
month the servicer deducts the servicing fee from the total mortgage payments
received from the homeowners before remitting the remainder to the MBS investors.
This means that the servicing fee is effectively an interest-only, first priority
tranche."); ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 807 ("The higher a servicer
can keep the principal balance... .the larger the monthly servicing fee will be.").
43 Foreclosing Modifications, supra note 6, at 816 ("Once a foreclosure is
complete... servicers are entitled to receive their advances back [from investors].
Servicers' advances are taken off the top, in full, at the post-foreclosure sale, before
investors receive anything."). Although foreclosed loans eliminate UPB - the main
source of servicers' income
servicers may be compensated for lost income
associated with the UPB during the period of default. See Levitin & Twomey, supra
note 6, at 70 ("Often, servicers cease to be permitted to collect their servicing fee
until the mortgage is liquidated or reinstated, although the fee accrues in the
meantime.").
4 ForeclosingModifications,supra note 6, at 807-09.
42

45 Id.

Id. at 765-68 (discussing the misalignment of incentives between servicers
on the one hand and investors and borrowers on the other); Levitin & Twomey,
46

supra note 6, at 70 ("....servicers are incentivized to favor modifications that reduce

interest rates rather than reduce principal, even if that raises the likelihood of
redefault."); see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: A
REVIEW OF TREASURY'S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMs at 59-60 (2010)
[hereinafter COP OVERSIGHT REPORT] ("the servicer's financial interests may be at

odds with the interests of the loan investors, who will generally receive far less from
a foreclosure than they will from a modification."). This is not to say that investors to
the same pool of mortgages placed in trust are uniformly aligned with each other or

that investor and borrower interests are fully aligned against servicers. Indeed,
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Hence, in servicing loans on behalf of loan investors under the
current securitization model, servicers may analyze the financial
impact of foreclosure compared to loan modification in a way that,
according to some, promotes servicer's financial interests over that of
investors. 47 By way of example, under the privity model, traditional
lenders exclusively profit from the mortgage loans they alone
originated, financed, serviced, and retained in their investment
portfolio.48 But traditional lenders - like today's investors - also
absorb all the foreclosure costs associated with delinquent loans. 4 9
Because traditional lenders do not know whether a foreclosure sale
will yield enough proceeds to fully cover the costs of its investment in
the mortgage loan (i.e., the mortgage principal plus the lifetime costs
of servicing the loan plus foreclosure costs), lenders bearing these
risks use the so-called Net Present Value ("NPV") test.5 0 Taking into
account foreclosure costs and the condition and value of the property
securing the mortgage, the NPV test determines whether monthly
mortgage payments can be reduced without sacrificing the loan's longterm profitability to the lender. 5 ' If the NPV test is positive,
modification is chosen over foreclosure.52 Hence, because traditional
lenders making the final decision whether to foreclose on a mortgage
loan incur the full cost of foreclosure but receive the full benefit of a
less profitable but fully performing loan, the privity model dictates that
foreclosure or modification be chosen only when objectively validated
by the NPV test.53
securitization has spawned "tranche warfare" among investors to the same mortgage
pool depending on the tranche in which they individually invested. In sum,
securitization has pitted servicers, investors, and borrowers against each other as
each tries to shift to the other losses created by the Great Unwinding. See id. at 59
("this misalignment of incentives [among investors] and the disputes that can result
from it are sometimes called 'tranche warfare."').
47 COP OVERSIGHT REPORT at 59-60. According to rational choice theory, it
makes perfect sense that servicers would try to maximize advantages inherent in the
securitization-based model of mortgage finance, just as investors in securitized pools
would not hesitate to foreclose if beneficial to their financial interest. For rational
choice theory, see Milton Friedman, ESSAYS INPOSITIVE ECONOMICS 15 (1953).
48

Held Up in Due Course, supra note 17, at 560-62.

49 ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 816.

so Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 11.
51
52

Id. at 5, 11, 71-78; ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 835.
Held Up in Due Course, supra note 17, at 544-45.

Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 11-12 ("In a traditional mortgage
lending relationship, a lender makes a loan, retains the loan in its portfolio, and
5
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In contrast, because servicers are more concerned about income
derived from UPB and do not bear the cost of foreclosed loans,
servicers tend to only consider the impact of loan modification on
UPB from which they derive their income. 5 4 Therefore, servicers are
prone to selectively use or subjectively interpret the NPV test
performed on loans held by unrelated investors in a way that
*
**55
maximizes servicer profits.
Under servicer-investor Pooling and Service contracts, servicers'
foreclosure determinations are theoretically done in the best interests
of the investors.56 However, because of the fragmented nature of
private RMBS investor ownership and the absence of clear rules
governing the duty of care of servicers to investors and to the trustees
appointed to oversee management of securitization trusts, effective
oversight of servicer behavior is lacking. Because each private label
non-agency securitization trust consists of hundreds of individually
serviced mortgages, and because securitization trust-backed RMBS are
sold on the global securities markets to hundreds of different private
and institutional investors, each with an ownership interest in distinct
"tranches," investors are generally unable to collectively speak with
one voice or take unified action against individual servicer foreclosure
decisions. 8 The lack of investor oversight of servicer behavior means
services the loan itself.... If the loan defaults, the lender will address the default with
the goal of maximizing the loan's net present value, subject to its own valuation
idiosyncrasies, such as liquidity needs... .A traditional portfolio lender has an
undivided economic interest in the loan's performance and therefore fully
internalizes the costs and benefits of its management decisions, such as whether to
restructure or foreclose on a defaulted loan.").
54 ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 807-09; Levitin & Twomey,
supra note 6, at 70 ("servicers are incentivized to favor modifications that reduce
interest rates rather than reduce principal, even if that raises the likelihood of
redefault.").
5s Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 71-78; see also COP OVERSIGHT
REPORT, supra note 46, at 72 ("The incentive payments to servicers under HAMP
are themselves an acknowledgment that servicers are not properly incentivized to
perform modifications, even when modifications would yield a positive net present
value for investors.").
56 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 31 ("Generally, however, [pooling and
service agreements] require servicers to manage the loans held by the trust as if for
their own account.").
57 Id. at 52.
58 Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 58 ("RMBS investors are globally
dispersed, presumably diversified, and hold transferable securities.... These
characteristics reduce their ability or incentive to monitor servicers."); Foreclosing
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that servicers generally have unchecked discretion to make selfinterested foreclosure and loan modification determinations with
minimal fear of investor or trustee action.5 9
In sum, the existing real estate mortgage finance system not only
gives servicers a disproportionate influence in making the final
determination whether an at-risk loan should be modified or
foreclosed, it also tends to incentivize servicers to favor foreclosure
over modification. At the time it created HAMP, Treasury was aware
of the unique characteristics of the securitized mortgage finance.60 As
described in the next section, Treasury did not design or enforce
HAMP in a way that sufficiently neutralizes servicer influence in the
loan modification process.
II. ANALYSIS

This section argues that HAMP failed to meet Congress' goal to
comprehensively address the foreclosure crisis because Treasury did
not alter the structural bias in the modem system of securitized
mortgage finance that incentivizes servicers to prefer foreclosure over
Modifications, supra note 6, at 768 ("Investors' inaction results from a common
action problem (how to coordinate hundreds of different investors with varying
interests?) and a dearth of hard information (if investors do not know if they are
losing or making money on a modification compared to a foreclosure, how can they
act effectively?).
59 ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 766, 768-770. RMBS investors
recently formed the Association of Mortgage Investors to promote their views
regarding federal foreclosure programs and servicer liability resulting from the
housing crash. See Investor Protection: The Need to Protect Investors from the
Government: Hearing Before House Committee on Financial Services,
Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 1 12th
Cong., 2 nd Sess. (June 7, 2012) (Statement of Vincent A. Fiorillo, DoubleLine
Capital, L.L.P., on behalf of the Association of Mortgage Investors).
60 See Letter from Rep. Dennis Kucinich, Chairman, House Subcommittee on
Domestic Policy, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to Rep. Barney
Frank, Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services (Nov. 17, 2008) (on file
with the author) (noting Treasury's rejection of proposals to implement EESA's
foreclosure prevention provisions that would have purchased "whole troubled
mortgages out of securitized trusts" from investors); see also Letter from Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner to Rep. Brad Miller, Member, U.S. House of
Representatives, May 7, 2010 (on file with the author) (Secretary Geithner rejects
proposal to buy "mortgages out of the trusts and other securitization vehicles that
own and control a substantial share of mortgage debt" as one means of addressing
the foreclosure crisis).
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loan modification. Three principal reasons account for this failure.
First, as shown below, because Treasury does not want to drive
servicers from the HAMP program, Treasury narrowly construes its
authority under the EESA of 2008, and neither enforces servicer
compliance with program guidelines nor affords borrowers an
opportunity to effectively challenge servicers' loan modification
denials. Second, as discussed in Section II D, because of Treasury's
reluctance to broadly interpret its authority, enforce program
guidelines, or create an effective dispute resolution or appeals process
for borrowers, servicers have wide latitude to implement HAMP
program guidelines according to their own preferences (such deference
makes Treasury's $1,000 incentive payment to servicers for each
permanent modification insufficient to alter servicer conduct). Third,
as described in Section II E, HAMP's enabling statute does not give
homeowners a private right of action to sue servicers for alleged
HAMP non-compliance, thus insulating servicers from judicial
oversight.
A. The HAMP Loan Modification Process

If properly implemented, HAMP is designed to separate loans
eligible for modification, which are capable of avoiding foreclosure,
from those that are not. This process is achieved under a series of
steps required by servicer and borrower alike, outlined in the HAMP
Handbook. 6 '
First, servicers sign Servicer Participation Agreements ("SPAs")
with Treasury, obligating servicers to comply with HAMP's terms and
conditions. 62 Second, servicers evaluate eligible borrowers - those in
default or at risk of imminent default - to assess whether borrower
debt load allows for reduced but sustainable monthly mortgage
payments over a period of 5 years without further risk of default. 63
See generally MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: HANDBOOK FOR
SERVICERS OF NON-GSE MORTGAGES (3.4 ed. 2011) [HEREINAFTER HAMP
HANDBOOK],
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/
hampservicer/mhahandbook_34.pdf.
61

62
COMMITMENT TO PURCHASE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT AND SERVICER
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT (example of a Model Template) [hereinafter SPA],

https://hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hampservicer/
servicerparticipationagreement.pdf.; see also HAMP HANDBOOK supra note 61, at
19.
63 HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note
61, at 78.
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Third, if reduced monthly payments are deemed sustainable, servicers
then apply the NPV test to determine whether it is more profitable for
the investor to have the loan modified or foreclosed.6 4 Fourth, if
modification is deemed more profitable than foreclosure, the borrower
is offered a trial period payment ("TPP") plan under which the
borrower is required to make three newly modified monthly payments
and to submit income verification data to servicers. 6 5 Lastly, if the
borrower complies with the TPP, the servicer is theoretically supposed
to automatically convert the TPP to a permanent modification, after
which the servicer receives a $1,000 incentive payment. 6 6
In designing HAMP, Treasury believed it could alter servicers'
inherent predisposition toward foreclosure by doing nothing more than
giving servicers a financial incentive payment of $1,000 for each loan
they permanently modify. 67 This strategy failed. Since HAMP's
creation in March 2009, these taxpayer-subsidized incentive payments
have only achieved just over 894,000 permanent active HAMP
modifications, with only 463,000 of those coming from the EESAfunded TARP program. These numbers are far below the four
million distressed borrowers Treasury originally estimated would
qualify for HAMP. 6 9
Despite these dismal results, Treasury stubbornly refuses to strictly
enforce servicer compliance with HAMP guidelines out of fear that
participating servicers will leave the program. 70 Treasury's fear of
driving servicers from the HAMP program is reflected in three ways:
(1) Treasury's narrow interpretation of its authority under HAMP's
enabling statute; (2) Treasury's decision to construe HAMP's program
guidelines in a way that gives servicers greater discretion to make loan
modification decisions than may be warranted by the guidelines; and
(3) the decision by Treasury to design the borrower dispute resolution
6 Id. at 85-89; see also infra Section II B. (regarding the importance of the
NPV test in determining whether it is more profitable for the investor to modify or
foreclose the loan).
65
66
67
68

HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 89.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 103.

69

Relief for Responsible Homeowners, supra note 2.
Paul Kiel, Secret Docs Show Foreclosure Watchdog Doesn't Bark
or Bite,

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS at 70 (JANUARY 2014).
70

PROPUBLICA (Oct. 4, 2011),
foreclosure-watchdog.

http://www.propublica.org/article/secret-docs-on-
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and appeals process in a way that circumvents the ability of borrowers
to effectively challenge adverse loan modification determinations by
the servicers.
B. Treasury's ConstrainedInterpretationofIts Statutory Authority and
HAMP Program Guidelines

Treasury believes it lacks sufficient legal authority under HAMP's
enabling statute, the EESA of 2008, to penalize participating servicers
for program violations. This is demonstrated by Treasury's narrow
interpretation of its authority under EESA's Section 109, which
stipulates that Treasury only use its authority to "encourage the
servicers of the underlying mortgages... to minimize foreclosures." 71
Treasury's narrow interpretation of its statutory authority is misguided.
First, the EESA gives Treasury an unequivocal mandate to take
appropriate action to mitigate the foreclosure crisis. For example,
Section 2 states that, among other things, the goal of the EESA is to
"protect home values ... [and] preserve homeownership." 7 2 Section
109 further instructs Treasury that it "shall implement a plan that seeks
to maximize assistance for homeowners to facilitate loan modifications
to prevent avoidable foreclosures." 73 Most important, however,
Section 109(c) states that Treasury shall consent, where appropriate,
and considering net present value to the taxpayer, to reasonable
requests for loss mitigation measures [by borrowers], including term
extensions, rate reductions, [and] principal write downs...." 74 In
drafting the Section 109(c) mandate, Congress statutorily adopted the
objective, industry-recognized NPV test for determining which loan
modification requests are "appropriate" and "reasonable," and must,
therefore be approved. In sum, in enacting the EESA, Congress
contemplated mandatory Treasury approval of all eligible loan

" 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a)(1) (emphasis supplied); see also Williams v. Geithner,
No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380, at *6 (D. Minn. 2009) ("the statute does
not create an absolute duty on the part of the Secretary to consent to loan

modifications....").

12 U.S.C. §§ 5201(2)(A)-(B).
n Id. § 5219(a)(1).
74 Id. § 5219(c) (emphasis added).
7 Id. § 5219(a)(1), (c).
72
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modifications objectively validated by the industry-recognized NPV
test.76
Second, Treasury's interpretation of the EESA that servicers
cannot be compelled to comply with HAMP's rules is inconsistent
with Treasury's own public statements and with servicers' pre-HAMP
legal obligations to manage at-risk loans in the best interests of
investors. 7 7 In announcing plans for HAMP, Treasury Secretary Tim
Geithner made clear that all financial institutions receiving U.S.
Government financial support under EESA's TARP program would be
required to participate in the EESA-authorized foreclosure mitigation
initiative.78 The largest U.S. bank servicers receive TARP support and,
according to Treasury's own statement, none can voluntarily leave the
program without penalty. 7 9 Additionally, even if servicers left HAMP,
some argue that servicers are already required by contract to consider
loan modification requests using the NPV test pursuant to pre-HAMP
obligations imposed on servicers for the benefit of investors, whom
servicers are expected to serve under Pooling and Service
agreements. 8 0
Despite apparent congressional support for a mandatory,
enforceable loan modification program for qualifying loans,
Treasury's narrow interpretation of the EESA is part of the larger
problem of deficient program design and implementation. In designing
HAMP, Treasury accorded HAMP's administrative structure and
implementing guidelines uncertain and ambiguous legal status. For
instance, unlike other federal regulatory programs that create
substantive standards of conduct that carry the force of law, HAMP's
program standards are not promulgated in accordance with the notice
The NPV test dictates whether the loan is to be modified or foreclosed.
Hence, according to this interpretation of HAMP's enabling statute, if the NPV test
concludes that a modified loan is more profitable for RMBS investors than
foreclosure, Treasury's and servicers' hands are tied; they must modify the loan. As
will be seen, however, Treasury and the courts upheld servicer discretion to tinker
with NPV inputs that may skew the NPV results.
7 Tim Geithner Outlines Stability Plan, supra note 2; Kiel, supra note 70.
7
Tim Geithner Outlines Stability Plan, supra note 2 ("All recipients of
[TARP] capital investments under the new initiatives announced today will be
required to commit to participate in mortgage foreclosure mitigation programs
consistent with guidelines Treasury will release on industry standard best
practices.").
79 Kiel, supra note 70.
76

80

Investor Protection: The Need to Protect Investors from the Government,

supra note 59 (Statement of Adam Levitin at 11-12).
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and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),81 nor published in the Federal Register, or memorialized as
enforceable regulations in the Code of FederalRegulations. HAMP's
guidelines are given secondary regulatory status as shown by their
posting on Treasury's website as "supplemental directives" to be
periodically indexed in a loose leaf compendium.82
Even though seemingly accorded uncertain legal status, Treasury's
HAMP guidelines are drafted in a way that appear to create specific
rights and duties susceptible to enforcement by the governmental body
responsible for publishing them. Hence, Treasury's ultimate refusal to
enforce servicer compliance with guidelines containing terms and
conditions that appear to create legally enforceable obligations
unfortunately gives unsuspecting homeowners the expectation that
promises made to them under the guidelines would somehow be
honored by servicers, and enforced by the government.
Because Treasury fears that penalizing servicers would drive them
from the HAMP program, Treasury treats servicers' obligations under
the Treasury-Servicer SPA as discretionary rather than mandatory. 83
This means that servicers can treat what some see as servicers'
" 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2013).
82
See HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 61. The legal authority accorded
administrative "guidelines" issued pursuant to congressional statute is beyond the
scope of this Note. The point here is that, in our well-ordered constitutional scheme
of separated powers, Treasury seems to have created in HAMP legal rights and
obligations that Treasury refuses to enforce administratively and borrowers cannot
enforce judicially. HAMP was never challenged on the grounds that the guidelines
should arguably be treated as "substantive" rules. The guidelines meet the definition
of that phrase from the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act (1947) (substantive rules are "rules issued pursuant to statutory authority to
implement statutory policy...."). According to one news report, lawyers for the
Treasury Department construe HAMP's guidelines as only establishing a contractual
relationship with participating services, as opposed to creating a formal regulatory
regime. Paul Kiel and Olga Pierce, Govt's Loan Mod Program Crippled by Lax
Oversight and Deference to Banks, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Govt's
Loan Mod Program Crippled]) ("But the [Treasury] staffers were walked back by
Treasury lawyers, who said the government was only party to a commercial contract
with servicers and not acting as their regulator.").
8

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET

RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS at 12-13 (Jan. 2011)

[hereinafter SIGTARP JAN. 2011 REPORT] ("Treasury recently told COP that since
participation by the servicers is purely voluntary, 'our abilities to enforce specific
performance are extremely limited' and 'aggressive enforcement [is] difficult."'); see
also Govt's Loan Mod ProgramCrippled,supra note 82.
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obligations in the modification process as purely voluntary, while atrisk borrowers continue to rely on servicers' representations with the
expectation that such representations are legally enforceable.
The SPA required to be signed by HAMP's participating servicers
appears to obligate servicers to honor HAMP's guidelines. Contrary to
the claims of Treasury, servicers, and various courts that the SPA only
confers purely discretionary duties on participating servicers and does
not obligate them to offer permanent loan modifications to qualifying
borrowers, a plain reading of the SPA suggests that it is a formal
contract imposing specific duties on those who agree to its terms.
Section 1.B. of the SPA is unequivocal:
Servicer shall perform the Services described in the
guidelines and procedures issued by the Treasury with
respect to the... [Making Home Affordable] Program
Guidelines... and... any supplemental documentation,
instructions, bulletins, frequently asked questions,
letters, directives, or other communications, including,
but not limited to, compliance requirements,
performance requirements and related remedies, issued
by Treasury. 84
Subsection 2.A. of the SPA further states that servicers "shall perform
the Services [required by the guidelines and procedures issued by
Treasury] for all mortgage loans its services, whether it services such
mortgage loans for its own account or for the account of another party,
including any holders of mortgage-backed securities." 85
Hence, according to its plain text, the SPA imposes a clear legal
duty on servicers to exercise the same level of due diligence in
protecting the financial interests of third party investors as they would
their own interests (e.g., require that the servicer apply and interpret
the NPV test for investor-held mortgages as the servicer would to
mortgages held in the servicer's own mortgage loan portfolio).
Section 1.C. of the SPA commits servicers to making
"representations and warranties" in which they acknowledge and agree
"to fulfill or satisfy certain duties and obligations with respect to its

SPA, supra note 62, at 2. The Making Home Affordable Program is
Treasur7's umbrella foreclosure prevention initiative of which HAMP is a subset.
Id. at 3.
84
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participation in the [HAMP] Program and under the Agreement." 86
Further, Section 1.C. contains an annual certification requirement
specifically imposed by Congress in which servicers attest to their
"continuing compliance with, and the truth and accuracy of, the
representations and warranties" made in the SPA. 87
Treasury's contention that it lacks authority to enforce servicer
compliance with HAMP guidelines does not comport with the SPA's
plain language. Section 6.A.(5), for example, gives Treasury authority
to reduce a servicer's incentive payments if Treasury's designated
program agents, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, find that a servicer's
performance is "materially insufficient" or does not "comply
materially" with HAMP's directives, performance criteria, or other
requirements. Section 6.1. of the SPA further states that remedies
available to Treasury for a servicer's breach of the SPA or "an Act of
Bad Faith" are "in addition to, and not in lieu of, any other remedies
available... in law or in equity." 89
Despite Treasury's consistent refusal to enforce servicer
compliance with HAMP's guidelines on the grounds that servicers
might leave the program, Treasury now concedes that withdrawal from
HAMP by bank servicers who receive financial assistance under
TARP would constitute a violation of the SPA, thus giving Treasury
standing to sue for specific performance. 90
C. The Absence of an Effective Borrower Appeals or Dispute Resolution
Process

To assist borrowers in resolving disputes with servicers, Treasury
created the HAMP Solution Center operated by Treasury's designated
HAMP compliance agent, Freddie Mac. The Center is found wanting;
the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO") found that
HAMP Solution Center staff lack authority to resolve complaints.91
According to watchdog groups, however, even if staff had such
" Id. at 2.
87 Id.
8 Id. at 5-6.
89 Id. at 8.
90 COP OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 46, at 51.
9' U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1 1-367R , TARP: RESULTS OF
HOUSING COUNSELORS SURVEY ON BORROWERS' EXPERIENCES WITH THE HOME
AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM (May 26, 2011). [hereinafter GAO HOUSING
COUNSELORS SURVEY].
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authority, it is questionable that Treasury would have exercised it.
Indeed, according to one study, even though Freddie Mac discovered
an 80% loan modification denial error rate by GMAC, one of the
nation's five largest servicers, Freddie Mac did nothing to reverse the
errors.92 Discovering wrongful denials in Freddie Mac's post-decision
audit review is of little practical value to aggrieved homeowners. By
the time the audits are completed their homes are likely to have
already been lost to foreclosure. 93 Even if HAMP's guidelines give
aggrieved borrowers an effective means to dispute servicers' loan
modification denials, they lack meaningful information with which to
challenge the evidentiary basis of the denials. That's because
Treasury's confidentiality rules prevent Freddie Mac's audit results
from being publicly released without the consent of the audited
servicer.9 4
In sum, Treasury designed a flawed borrower dispute resolution
and appeals process that prevents borrowers from holding servicers
administratively accountable for making potentially erroneous loan
modification denials. 95 Combined with Treasury's constrained view of
its statutory and administrative authority to compel servicers to
comply with HAMP guidelines, servicers are given considerable
leeway in the loan modification decision-making process. 96
D. Lack of Treasury Oversight Gives Servicers'BroadDiscretion
Over the Loan ModificationDeterminationProcess

Treasury's failure to impose checks on servicer discretion to deny
potentially eligible loan modification requests is the root cause of
Kiel, supra note 66 ("GMAC had seriously mishandled many loan
modifications-miscalculating homeowner income in more than 80 percent of
audited cases, for example. Yet, GMAC suffered no penalty. GMAC itself said it
hasn't reversed a single foreclosure as a result of a government audit.").
93 Id.
94 Id.; see also SIGTARP, THE NET PRESENT VALUE TEST'S IMPACT ON THE
HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, 12-003, June 18, 2012, at 14
92

[hereinafter SIGTARP NET PRESENT VALUE REPORT] ("Treasury failed to document

its oversight, stating that some of its oversight is conducted in such a way that there
would be no formal documentation. Accordingly, SIGTARP was unable to verify
Treasury's role in the oversight of servicers by Freddie Mac.").
9 SIGTARP

JAN.

2011 REPORT, supra note 83, at 13 ("Treasury continues to

operate an appeals system that leaves the ultimate decision of whether to approve or
deny a modification squarely with the servicer.").
96

Id.
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HAMP's failure. 9 7 Either because Treasury earnestly believes it is not
required to grant modifications of all qualifying loans, or fear that
strict program enforcement will drive servicers from the program,
Treasury apparently decided that servicers are fully capable of
neutrally applying and interpreting loan modification criteria without
regard to their own financial interest.98 From a practical stand point,
however, it does not make sense that Congress would authorize
Treasury to administer a program for the sole purpose of facilitating
loan modifications to prevent avoidable foreclosures and then allow
self-interested servicers broad, seemingly unfettered discretion to
make final loan modification determinations. 99 In short, servicers are
only able to exercise discretion to deny potentially qualified loan
modifications because Treasury lets them do it.00
Findings and conclusions by federal auditors demonstrate the
extent to which Treasury deference to servicer discretion helps
frustrate program goals.' 0' Practices identified by auditors include:
97

Id.

9' Id. at 12-13.
99 See 12 U.S.C.

§ 5219(a)(1) ("the Secretary shall implement a plan that
seeks to maximize assistance for homeowners and use the authority of the Secretar
to encourage the servicers of the underlying mortgages, considering net present value
to the taxpayer, to take advantage of.... available programs to minimize
foreclosures") (emphasis supplied); 12 U.S.C. § 5219(c) ("the Secretary shall
consent, where appropriate, and considering net present value to the taxpayer, to
reasonable requests for loss mitigation measures, including term extensions, rate
reductions, principal write downs, increases in the proportion of loans within a trust
or other structure allowed to be modified, or removal of other limitation on
modifications.") (emphasis supplied).
100 In one of the first adjudicated HAMP cases, Williams v. Geithner, No. 091959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380 (D. Minn. 2009), because plaintiffs pled the
wrong claim for relief under the HAMP, the court held that servicers are conferred
authority under the HAMP program to make loan modification determinations.
Plaintiffs claimed that EESA created a constitutionally protected "liberty or property
interest" in a HAMP loan modification, thus making HAMP modifications
mandatory. Such an extreme argument is contrary to the plain reading of 12 U.S.C. §
5219(c), which only requires Treasury consent to reasonable loan modification
requests, e.g., those that qualify under the NPV test. Thus, having only to address
whether all HAMP loan modification requests are "absolutely mandatory" regardless
of NPV test results, as asserted by the plaintiffs in Williams, the court did not have to
address the issue of Congress' intent in the EESA of 2008 to require Treasury to
approve all reasonable loan modification requests that qualify under the NPV test.
'0o See generally GAO HOUSING COUNSELORS SURVEY, supra note 91;
SIGTARP NET PRESENT VALUE REPORT, supra note 94; COP OVERSIGHT REPORT,
supra note 46.
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denying permanent modifications to borrowers who have fully
complied with their obligations under the 90-day trial modification
payment period ("Trial Period Plan," or "TPP"); initiating foreclosure
actions against HAMP applicants after servicers promised to suspend
foreclosure proceedings pending consideration of loan modification
requests; misapplying the NPV test essential to determining whether a
modified loan is preferable to foreclosure; and unduly delaying the
application process by losing or misplacing paperwork, which allow
HAMP-eligible loans to continue to foreclosure without borrower

knowledge.102
The extent of servicer discretion under HAMP is highlighted by
HAMP litigation addressing whether servicers must grant permanent
loan modifications to borrowers who ultimately comply with
contractual conditions imposed during the initial, 90-day trial
modification payment period (e.g., the TPP).10 3 According to HAMP
guidelines, if the borrower's loan receives a positive NPV score, loan
modification is more beneficial for the investor than is foreclosure,
thus qualifying the borrower for a trial modification pursuant to a
In theory, because a positive NPV qualifies the borrower for
TPP.
the TPP, assuming there is no change in conditions during the time the
TPP is in effect and the borrower complies with all of the TPP's
requirements, the borrower should qualify for a permanent
modification. 0 5 Only if the borrower commits fraud in the income
102 GAO HOUSING COUNSELORS SURVEY, supra note 91, at 4; SIGTARP NET
PRESENT VALUE REPORT, supra note 94, at 5; COP OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note
46, at 16.
103 See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 562 (7th Cir. 2012)
(in granting plaintiff Wigod a TPP, "Wells Fargo communicated to Wigod that she
qualified for HAMP and would receive a permanent 'Loan Modification Agreement'
after the trial period, provided she was 'in compliance with this Loan Trial Period
and [her] representations... continued to be true in all material respects.'" According
to the plaintiff, once she met those conditions, Wells Fargo arguably was obligated to
grant the permanent modification).
104 HAMP SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE ("SD") 09-01, April 6, 2009 at 4
[hereinafter HAMP SD 09-01] ("If the NPV result for the modification scenario is
greater than the NPV result for no modification, the result is deemed 'positive' and
the servicer MUST offer the modification"); see also SIGTARP THE NET PRESENT
VALUE REPORT, supra note 94, at 1 ("The NPV test is the gateway through which an
otherwise eligible homeowner gets help under HAMP.... A key to understanding the
NPV test is to know that it estimates whether it is in the best interests of the investor
to modify a mortgage under HAMP.").
105 HAMP SD 09-01, supra note 104, at 4 ("If the borrower complies with the
terms and conditions of the Trial Period Plan, the loan modification will become
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verification process - or otherwise fails to meet the technical
conditions of the TPP - can a permanent modification be denied to the
TPP-compliant borrower.106 However, despite the requirement that full
TPP compliance automatically qualify borrowers for permanent
modification, courts have upheld servicer discretion to deny permanent
status to fully-compliant TPP borrowers. 0 7
The question of whether HAMP's guidelines allow servicers to
deny permanent modifications to TPP-compliant borrowers should
effective on the first day of the month following the trial period specified in the Trial
Period Plan"); HAMP SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE 10-01, Jan. 28, 2010 at 8
[hereinafter HAMP SD 10-01] ("Borrowers who make all trial period payments
timely and who satisfy all other trial period requirements will be offered a permanent
HAMP modification."); see also GAO, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL ADDRESSEES,
FORECLOSURE MITIGATION: AGENCIES COULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL
EFFORTS WITH ADDITIONAL DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, GAO-12-296 (June
2012) at 18 [hereinafter GAO JUNE 2012 FORECLOSURE MITIGATION REPORT]

("Upon successful completion of the trial period, servicers are required to offer
borrowers a permanent modification.").
106
HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 93 ("Servicers should not
[permanently] modify a mortgage loan if there is reasonable evidence indicating the
borrower submitted income information that is false or misleading or if the borrower
otherwise engaged in fraud in connection with the modification.").
107 See, e.g., Vida v. OneWest Bank, Civ. No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL
5148473, *6 (D. Ore. Dec. 13, 2010) (upholding servicers' denial of permanent
modification despite borrower's full compliance with the TPP because HAMP's
enabling statute does not mandate modification and "the [Trial Period] Plan states
explicitly that modification is not guaranteed until the modification process is
complete, and not at any intermediate point in the modification process.... The Trial
Period Plan is explicitly not an enforceable offer for [permanent] loan
modification."). Recent commentary attempts to address inconsistencies among the
courts as to whether borrower compliance with the TPP alone entitles the borrower
to a permanent HAMP modification, either pursuant to HAMP guidelines or as a
contractual right under state law. See, e.g., Arsen Sarapinian, FightingForeclosure:
Using Contract Law to Enforce the Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP), 64 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (2013); Harry Arger and Brett Natarelli, Supportfor
Dismissal of State Law Based HAMP TPP Cases, BUS. LAW TODAY 1, (Jan. 2013);
W. Justin Jacobs, Help or Hamp(er) - The Courts' Reluctance to Provide the Right
to a Private Action Under HAMP and its Detrimental Effect on Homeowners, 47
VAL. U. L. REv. 267 (2012). The point of this Note, however, is that uncertainty
regarding whether TPP-compliant borrowers do, in fact, automatically qualify for
permanent modification is yet another example of the complexity wrought by
securitized mortgage finance confronted by policy makers and judges attempting to
resolve disputes among stakeholders - a complexity compounded by HAMP's
ineffective and ambiguous design, and deference given by Treasury to servicers in
the HAMP process.

270

require a simple answer. But the absence of verifiable data to support
servicers' loan modification decisions impairs judicial ability to make
findings of fact required for determining whether a servicer is
obligated to convert the TPP to permanent status. os Without data to
verify the evidentiary basis for servicers' denials, servicers have been
found to routinely deny permanent modifications on the grounds that
borrowers fail to comply with required documentation requests during
the trial period. 109
The inability to verify the evidentiary basis for servicers' loan
denials raises the question of whether servicers abuse discretionary
authority afforded them by Treasury under the HAMP guidelines in
conducting additional NPV tests after an initial NPV test first qualifies
the borrower for a trial modification. "o The NPV test determines
whether loan modification is more beneficial to the investor than
foreclosure, and represents the "gateway" through which HAMP
applicants must pass to qualify for a loan modification."' The text of
HAMP's guidelines give servicers little discretion regarding the NPV
model used and the specific data inputs that may be deployed when re108

See GAO HOUSING COUNSELORS SURVEY, supra note 91, at 8 ("Treasury

has reported that one of the most common reasons for canceling trial modifications is
insufficient documentation. However, Treasury indicated that it was unable to
determine whether borrowers had not submitted the required documentation or
servicers had lost or misplaced it.").
109 See, e.g., Vida, 2010 WL 5148473 at *2 (OneWest told the borrower "that

the trial period had been cancelled because OneWest had not received all of the
necessary documentation" but later admitted that modification was not denied for
this reason but rather because of the negative results of a second NPV test conducted
during the Trial Period Plan offered the borrower after the first NPV test had scored
positiv/e).
110 Before June 1, 2010, servicers conducted two NPV tests - one on the basis
of borrowers' stated income that resulted in a trial modification and a second test
based on verified income submitted after the Trial Period Plan began. After June 1,
2010, however, verified income had to be submitted by borrowers prior to
conducting an initial NPV test to assess whether the borrower qualified for a trial
modification. In theory, therefore, post-TPP NPV re-testing should not be needed
after June 1, 2010, unless borrowers claim a change in circumstances. See HAMP SD
10-01, supra note 105, at 1 ("Effective for all HAMP trial period plans with effective
dates on or after June 1, 2010, a servicer may only offer a borrower a trial period
plan based on verified income documentation in accordance with this Supplemental
Directive.").
"1 SIGTARP THE NET PRESENT VALUE REPORT, supra note 94, at 1 ("The
NPV test is the gateway through which an otherwise eligible homeowner gets help
under HAMP.....").
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testing a borrower's loan that already tested positive for a trial
modification.112 The guidelines state that "servicers should test a
borrower using the same major version of the NPV model" that was
used to test the loan for trial modification eligibility, and all "NPV
inputs should remain constant when the borrower is retested," except
those found to be incorrect at the time of the initial NPV evaluation.1 3
The guidelines further state that when servicers reevaluate TPPapproved borrowers, "all NPV inputs should remain constant... except
those inputs that are determined to be materially inaccurate" from
those used in the first pre-TPP test.114
Because servicers do not always comply with document retention
and disclosure requirements in connection with NPV testing and retesting, it is impossible for borrowers, investors, or auditors to know
whether servicers are complying with HAMP's NPV re-test
procedures.115 Although there is no direct evidence that servicers
manipulate the outcome of the NPV re-testing process, servicer noncompliance with NPV document retention requirements makes it
impossible for borrowers to know whether they are being wrongfully
denied.116 Borrower suspicions regarding servicers' motives are
compounded by findings by the GAO that 15 of the 20 largest
servicers failed to conduct NPV tests in compliance with HAMP
guidelines, including failure "to hold certain data constant when
112

COP OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 46, at 62 ("Servicers are limited in

their flexibility to tweak these inputs and variables....").
113

HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 88.

Id. at 89.
115 For the requirement that servicers maintain detailed
documentation of
NPV tests, see HAMP HANDBOOK, supra note 61, at 86 ("Whether or not a
modification is pursued, the servicer must maintain detailed documentation of the
NPV model used, all NPV inputs and assumptions and the NPV results."). For
purported violation of these document retention requirements, see SIGTARP THE
NET PRESENT VALUE REPORT, supra note 94, at 10 ("Because of the servicers'
failure to maintain documentation of the NPV inputs, SIGTARP was unable to
determine how many homeowners from its sample may have been wrongly denied a
HAMP modification.").
116
See SIGTARP NET PRESENT VALUE REPORT, supra note 94, at 17
(SIGTARP found that "servicers failed to comply with HAMP guidelines on
maintaining records on NPV inputs, which is crucial for compliance and to protect
114

homeowners ' rights to challenge servicer error."); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY

REPORT TO CONGRESS at 186-87 (JULY 2012) (Treasury does not enforce "HAMP

guidelines requir[ing] that the servicer list certain NPV inputs and provide vital
information on foreclosure alternatives in the [borrower] denial letter.").

272

rerunning the NPV model for borrowers they were evaluating for a
permanent HAMP modification.""' Additionally, auditors determined
that Treasury gives servicers broad discretion to utilize a "risk
premium" in NPV analyses that skews the final results in favor of
foreclosure over modification.1
Some HAMP litigants claim that servicers manipulate the HAMP
process by deliberately granting trial modifications for loans they
never intend to make permanent for the sole purpose of enhancing
income associated with prolonged borrower delinquency.1
Depending on the precise status and circumstances of the loan in
question, prolonging delinquency may enhance servicer income
because servicers are fully reimbursed for foreclosure costs, late fees,
"
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-634, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY AND EQUITABLY
IMPLEMENT FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS (June 24, 2010) at 20-21
(hereinafter GAO FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED) ("This lack of compliance likely

resulted in differences in how borrowers were evaluated, and could have resulted in
the inequitable treatment of similarly situated borrowers.").
118 Id.; SIGTARP THE NET PRESENT VALUE REPORT, supra note 94, at 5
(With respect to inappropriate inclusion of the maximum allowable "risk premium"
of 2.5% in the NPV analysis to estimate future default risk by HAMP applicants,
SIGTARP cites GAO's conclusion that the "higher the risk premium a servicer
chooses, the fewer the number of loans that are likely to pass the NPV model
because expected future cash flows [to RMBS investors] would have less value.");
see also COP OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 46, at 62-65 (noting major

deficiencies in servicer administration of the NPV test that skews final modification
decisions).
'19 See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 558 (7th Cir. 2012);
Foreclosing Modifications, supra note 6, at 829 ("As long as servicers can choose
not to perform [permanent] modifications, they will, by and large, choose the path of
least resistance - foreclosures and temporary modifications that strip wealth from
investors and homeowners."). (emphasis supplied); Levitin & Twomey, supra note
6, at 77 ("servicers' compensation structures encourage them to stretch out defaults,

but not too long. In other words, servicers want to keep borrowers in a default
"sweatbox" to collect late fees and other junk fees, but only until the profit
maximizing point," citing Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box "
of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 375 (describing a credit card lending
business model in which the lender desires extended default in order to maximize fee
revenue); ForeclosingModifications, supra note 6, at 777 ("For servicers, the true
sweet spot lies in stretching out a delinquency without either a modification or a
foreclosure. While financing advances is a large expense for servicers, one they will
want to end as soon as possible, late fees and other default-related fees can add
significantly to servicers' bottom line, and the longer a homeowner is in default, the
larger those fees can be. The nether-world status between a foreclosure and a
modification also boosts the monthly servicing fee....").
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and advances made to investors during the period in which a loan is
delinquent.120 Allegations that servicers deliberately grant temporary
HAMP modifications (based on the initial NPV test) for the sole
purpose of denying them later (based on a NPV re-test) cannot be
verified because servicer non-compliance with NPV document
retention requirements makes it difficult for auditors to assess the
validity of servicer denials.121 For the same reason, auditors are unable
to validate servicers' claims that permanent modifications are rejected
for lack of borrower paperwork.122 According to borrowers,
prolonging the life of a loan's delinquency maximizes the borrower's
unpaid principal balance (UPB) - the lifeblood of servicer income.1 2 3
For example, by denying permanent status to a previously granted
HAMP trial modification at a lower than normal monthly payment,
servicers can fold into the final UPB the difference between the
borrower's mortgage monthly payment required under the original
mortgage and the lower monthly mortgage payments made under the
lower temporary modification amount, along with late fees and other
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 47 ("Foreclosure expenses have
priority in repayment over all other claims, including investors'. Servicers are thus
paid off the top from foreclosure sale proceeds."). Even though servicers must make
advances to RMBS investors during the time the loan is delinquent, servicers have a
priority lien on the securitization trust for costs associated with delinquent loans once
the loan is foreclosed. At foreclosure, servicers are fully reimbursed for all costs
incurred and charged as a result of the delinquency. Id. at 41-42 ("Servicers are
typically permitted to retain any ancillary fees they levy on the homeowner to the
extent they are collected. Ancillary fees are imposed on borrowers to compensate
servicers for the occurrence of particular events, such as late payment, bounced
checks, and mortgage modification or extension.... Mortgage loan documents
typically provide for servicers to retain late fees (typically 5% of the monthly
payment) and fees for any costs involved in collection, including the costs of
foreclosure and maintaining the property.... Ancillary fees are a crucial part of the
servicers' income.").
121 SIGTARP THE NET PRESENT VALUE REPORT, supra note 94, at 10 (lack of
120

compliance with NPV documentation requirements);

GAO FURTHER ACTIONS

NEEDED, supra note 117, at 20-21 (15 of the 20 largest servicers failed to conduct the
NPV test in compliance with HAMP guidelines).
122 GAO HOUSING COUNSELORS SURVEY, supra note 91, at 8 ("Treasury has

reported that one of the most common reasons for canceling trial modifications is
insufficient documentation. However, Treasury indicated that it was unable to
determine whether borrowers had not submitted the required documentation or
servicers had lost or misplaced it.").
123 Foreclosing Modifications, supra note 6, at 807 (servicers income is
derived from a monthly percentage of borrower's unpaid principal balance (UPB);
hence, the higher the UPB, the higher the servicers' monthly income).
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charges associated with delinquent loans.124 Borrowers argue that
receiving a Trial Period Plan induces them to forego viable foreclosure
alternatives they would have otherwise pursued had servicers disclosed
that approval of a trial plan is no guarantee of a permanent
modification, or that post-TPP NPV tests may be conducted that
produce results at variance from the first NPV test.125
In summary, Treasury's design, implementation, and oversight of
HAMP gives servicers broad discretion to make loan modification
determinations that some claim are inconsistent with the goal of
HAMP. Because Treasury treats servicer obligations under the HAMP
Servicer Participation Agreement ("SPA") as purely voluntary and
fails to give aggrieved borrowers an effective dispute resolution and
appeals mechanism to dispute the basis of loan modification denials,
borrowers are left little choice but to seek recourse in the courts.
E. Statutory and Regulatory Limits on Homeowners'Ability to
Enforce Servicer Obligations Under HAMP

Because homeowners cannot rely on Treasury to either enforce
servicer compliance with HAMP's guidelines or provide borrowers an
effective means to administratively challenge modification denials,
homeowners have taken their cases to court. But even here
homeowners have encountered difficulty in getting their grievances
heard.12 6 Courts uniformly hold that the EESA denies borrowers
standing to sue servicers for purported violations of HAMP
124

Levitin & Twomey, supra note 6, at 77; ForeclosingModifications, supra

note 6, at 777; see also Wigod, 673 F3d at 558 ("Wigod timely made, and Wells
Fargo accepted, all four payments due under the trial plan.... Nevertheless, Wells
Fargo declined to offer Wigod a permanent HAMP modification.... After the
expiration of the TPP, Wells Fargo warned Wigod that she owed the outstanding
balance and late fees and, in a subsequent letter, that she was in default on her home
mortgage loan.... [Wigod] continued to make mortgage payments in the reduced
amount due under the TPP, even after the trial term ended.... In the meantime, Wells
Fargo sent Wigod monthly notices threatening to foreclose if she failed to pay the
accumulating amount of delinquency based on the original loan terms.") (emphasis
supplied).
125 See Wigod, 673 F3d at 574-76 (upholding plaintiffs claim under the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act that she incurred
"actual pecuniary loss" due to servicer's alleged misrepresentations regarding the
conditions needed to obtain a permanent loan modification, noting the alternatives to
foreclosure that plaintiff might have pursued but for the alleged misrepresentations).
126 See generally Sarapinian,supra note 107; Jacobs, supra note 107.
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guidelines.1 27 Although in March 2012 the Seventh Circuit, in Wigod
v. Wells Fargo, upheld borrower standing to sue servicers on statebased common law theories of breach of contract, covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, promissory estoppel, and fraudulent
misrepresentation in connection with HAMP, the ruling will do little to
comprehensively address the ongoing foreclosure crisis as Congress

intended in EESA.12 8
Courts agree that the EESA does not provide borrowers standing
to sue servicers for purported violations of their obligations created by
HAMP's guidelines.1 29 First, the EESA statutorily confers to Treasury
- or the Treasury's designated agent, Freddie Mac -the authority to
enforce servicer compliance with programs created under EESA.13 As
noted previously in Section II C, however, Treasury is reluctant to
enforce HAMP guidelines against servicers for fear of driving them
from the program, and Treasury's designated HAMP compliance
agent, Freddie Mac, does not require servicers to reverse improper
modification denials.131 Second, the EESA does not confer either an
explicit or implicit cause of action to aggrieved HAMP applicants to
directly sue servicers for servicer violations.132 Third, although
borrowers seeking remedies for servicer violations are only able to sue
Treasury,' 33 these actions are premised on the narrow legal question of
whether HAMP's enabling statute mandates Treasury approval of all
loan modification requests regardless of their eligibility under the NPV

See, e.g., Williams v. Geithner, No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL
3757380 (D. Minn. 2009).
128 For discussion of the 'h and I th Circuits disagreement
5
with the Wigod
1
approach to breach of HAMP's Trial Period Plan as constituting a common law
breach of contract, see Argur and Natarelli, supra note 107.
129 Williams v. Geithner, 2009 WL 3757380 (D. Minn.
2009).
130 12 U.S.C. §§ U.S.C. 29 (2013).
1 See Section II C, supra note 92.
132 Robinson v. Wells Fargo, 2010 WL 2534192, *4-6 (D. Ariz.
June 1, 2010)
("While Congress created a right to sue the Secretary, the judicial review section of
TARP never mentions a right of action against non-governmental entities, such as
financial institutions receiving TARP funds."); Benito v. Indymac Mortgage Serv.,
2010 WL 2130648, *7 (D. Nev. 2010) ("although the overall HAMP program
undoubtedly has a goal of assisting homeowners, the HAMP Agreement does not
express any intent to grant borrowers a right to enforce the HAMP contract between
the government and loan servicer.").
" 12 U.S.C. §2 U29 (2012); see also Robinson v. Wells Fargo, 2010 WL
2534192.
127
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test.' 3 4 In Williams v. Geithner, for example, the court dismissed
borrower claims that HAMP's enabling statute created a
constitutionally "protected liberty or property interest" entitling
HAMP applicants to loan modifications pursuant to due process.13
Citing Supreme Court precedent that a protected property interest is
not created by a statute that "grants to the decision-maker discretionary
authority in [the statute's] implementation,"l 36 Williams held that,
because HAMP's NPV test vests discretion in servicers to reject loan
modifications, the discretionary nature of HAMP loan modification
process does not constitute a constitutionally "protected liberty or
property interest" subject to due process.' 37
Lastly, all but two HAMP cases have held that HAMP applicants
cannot claim status as intended third-party beneficiaries of the SPAs
entered into between Treasury and servicers.138 Nevertheless, the
134
'3

Williams v. Geithner, 2009 WL 3757380 (D. Minn. 2009).
Id.

Id. at 5, citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564,
570 (1972).
137 Id. at 5-6. Beyond the scope of this Note is whether Congress' decision
to
restrict EESA's private cause of action to claims against the Treasury Secretary left
the plaintiffs in Williams no choice but to assert a claim of "protected liberty or
property interest," an extremely difficult standard to satisfy in this era of broad
congressional delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. As previously
noted in Section II D, supra note 100, the issue is not Treasury's refusal to require
approval of all loan modifications as asserted in Williams, but rather Treasury's
refusal to ensure that servicer discretion in evaluating loan modification requests
comport with servicer obligations in Servicer Participation agreements, including
NPV test inputs and document retention requirements, and HAMP guidelines that
require that fully compliant trial modifications be made permanent.
138 See, e.g., Marks v. Bank of America, No. 03:10-civ-08039, 2010 WL
2572988, *4-5 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010), for the proposition that HAMP does not
confer third-party beneficiary status of borrowers seeking to modify their loans under
the HAMP ("While the intent of the HAMP might be to benefit qualified borrowers,
statements of purpose are not enough to defeat the presumption against intended
beneficiaries under government contracts. Rather, Plaintiff is an incidental
beneficiary because there is no clear intent to the contrary," citing Astra USA v.
Santa Clara County, 131 S.Ct. 1342 (2011). The two exceptions are Parker v. Bank
of America, NA, CIV.A. I1-1838, 2011 WL 6413615 (Mass. Super. Dec. 16, 2011),
and Marques v. Wells Fargo, Civil No. 09-1985-L, 2010 WL 3212131, *4-5 (S.D.
Cal. Aug. 12, 2010). Marques held that borrowers are third-party beneficiaries of
HAMP, relying on the 9th Circuit's opinion in Astra USA v. Santa Clara County,
588 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2009) that hospitals are third-party beneficiaries of drug
pricing agreements between the federal government and pharmaceutical companies.
But Marques was decided before U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded Astra
B6
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Massachusetts superior court in Parker v. Bank of America challenged
the rationale used in prior HAMP decisions for refusing to classify atrisk borrowers as third-party beneficiaries of HAMP.13 9 Parker found
that the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Astra USA v. Santa County
Clara denying third-party beneficiary status to one group of
stakeholders under a federal health care statute does not apply to
HAMP.14 0 Astra USA held that competing program stakeholders have
no statutory private cause of action to sue each other under an Act of
Congress that created an "administrative enforcement system" proven
effective in adjudicating stakeholder disputes, and subject those final
adjudications to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
effective
the
comparatively
Parker distinguished
Act.141
administrative enforcement mechanism at issue in Astra USA from the
flawed mechanism created by Treasury for resolving HAMP disputes
between borrowers and servicers. 142 Unlike the statute at issue in Astra
USA, because the EESA does not provide judicial review of HAMP
denials or allow aggrieved borrowers to sue servicers for contractual
violations of the Treasury-Servicer SPA, Parker reasoned that HAMP
applicants should at least be able to resolve disputes in court.143
Despite Parker's insightful analysis regarding HAMP's administrative
deficiencies, there is no indication that Parker will reverse the tide
against standing to sue by HAMP borrowers claiming third-party
beneficiary status.
Unable to compel Treasury enforcement of HAMP guidelines or to
sue servicers for purported HAMP violations, some courts embrace an
USA on the grounds that, under the statute in question, hospitals are not intended
third-party beneficiaries who can sue to enforce the contract. Parker is discussed
infra.
' Parker v. Bank of America, WL 6413615.
140 Id. at *8-9, distinguishing borrowers in HAMP from hospitals in Astra
USA v. Santa Clara County.
141 Parker v. Bank of America, WL 6413615 at *8-9, describing the program
at issue in Astra USA.
142 Id. at 9.
143 Id. ("there is nothing in the standard-form [HAMP] SPA to
suggest that

borrowers - who were obviously and primarily intended to benefit from the
contractual commitments made by servicers in exchange for their receipt of billions
of TARP dollars - should not be allowed to enforce those commitments. They have
no other forum in which their claims may be heard and adjudicated. Denial of thirdparty beneficiary status to persons aggrieved by violations such as are alleged here
would be... to mock the very goals of the program that the contract was intended to
further, placing its legitimacy... in grave doubt.") (internal quotations omitted).
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alternative cause of action by aggrieved homeowners based on state
law theories of tort and contracts.14 4 Courts have rejected commonlaw-based theories of servicer liability in carrying out HAMP
obligations on the grounds that state claims based on theories of
breach of contract, covenants of good faith and fair dealing,
promissory estoppel, and fraudulent misrepresentation are simply back
door attempts to enforce a private right of action under HAMP - an
action held improper by the courts.14 5 These courts dismiss borrowers'
state-based common law claims because they are premised on
servicers' obligations arising under a federal program pursuant to a
federal statute that does not authorize a private cause of action against
servicers.146
In what was seen as potentially ground-breaking, the Seventh
Circuit, in Wigod v. Wells Fargo, sustained borrower claims against a
servicer for common law breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and
fraudulent misrepresentation, as well as the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act, all in connection with the servicer's duty of care with regard to a
HAMP modification.14 7 In doing so, Wigod successfully undercuts the
rationale adopted by other courts in holding that HAMP claims
premised on common law breach of duty violate the EESA's bar on
borrower causes of action against servicers. 148
First, Wigod upheld plaintiffs state-based common law claims by
rejecting the servicer's theory that raising common law claims is
merely an "end run" around EESA's bar on borrower actions to
enforce servicer obligations under HAMP.1 49 The Wigod court said the
"end-run" argument erroneously "conflated two distinct lines of
cases": the federal private right of action on the one hand and the
14

See generally Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir.

2012).
145 Marks v. Bank of America, No. 03:10-civ-08039, 2010 WL 2572988, *5
(D. Ariz. June 22, 2010) ("Plaintiffs allegations regarding breach of contract are
simply an attempt at enforcing a private right of action under HAMP.").
146 Vida v. OneWest Bank, Civ. No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, *5 (D.
Ore. Dec. 13, 2010) ("The flaw in Vida's logic is that the alleged offer to modify
came about and was made wholly under the rubric of HAMP, as were Vida's alleged
actions in acceptance of the offer, i.e., submitting the required documentation, and
the alleged consideration, i.e., remitting reduced loan payments. Vida fails to state a
cause of action independent of HAMP, for which there is no private right of
action.").
14
Wigod, 673 F.3d 547.
148 Id. at 576-585.
149 Id. at 581-85.
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federal preemption of state law on the other. 5 0 Wigod held that the
former consists of congressional statutes that limit remedies to only
those exclusively identified by Congress, which cannot be judicially
enlarged;' 5 ' the latter, however, consist of federal statutes - regardless
of whether they include a private cause of action - intended by
Congress to explicitly or implicitly "displace [sic] remedies otherwise
available under state law," even those remedies that might be based
"on some element of the federal law."' 5 2 Analyzing controlling federal
precedent construing the nature and scope of the federal private cause
of action and federal preemption doctrines, Wigod concludes that
courts have improperly determined that simply because Congress did
not create a private borrower cause of action in the EESA for
aggrieved homeowners, Congress must have intentionally barred them
from seeking any remedy for alleged servicer misconduct arising from
the HAMP loan modification process. 5 3
Second, having established that the EESA's bar on private causes
of action does not necessarily prevent homeowners from pursuing
state-based common law claims against servicers for conduct arising
under HAMP, Wigod next took on the far more difficult task of
150

Id. at 581.

151 Id.
152

Id.
Id. ("The end-run theory is built on the novel assumption that where
Congress does not create a private right of action for violation of a federal law, no
right of action may exist under state law, either.... The issue here, however, is not
whether federal law itself provides private remedies [e.g., a statutorily created
private cause of action], but whether it displaces remedies otherwise available under
state law [e.g., a federal law intended to preempt state law.] The absence of a private
right of action from a federal statute provides no reason to dismiss a claim under a
state law just because it refers to or incorporates some element of the federal law.").
Wigod added that even where a state law claim incorporates federal law, it has never
disabled state law claims "whether the federal law has a private right of action or
not." Id. at 582. Wigod relies heavily on the opinion of U.S. District Court Judge
William Hibbler of Illinois' Northern District. Judge Hibbler concluded that the rule
of federal preemption can be the only justification for the proposition that a federal
statute lacking a private cause of action automatically preempts state common law
claims for violation of that federal statute. See Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, 798 F.
Supp.2d 925, 930-31 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (courts that preclude borrowers from suing
servicers on state-based claims do not cite any "general rule that where a state
common law theory provides for liability for conduct that is also violative of federal
law, a suit under the state common law is prohibited so long as the federal law does
not provide for a private right of action. Indeed, it seems the only justification for
such a rule would be federal preemption of state law.").
153
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distinguishing servicer conduct purely governed by traditional
common law duties of care from servicer conduct directly governed by
HAMP-imposed duties of care.154 The distinction is critical because
courts holding that the EESA preempts state-based claims for
purported servicer misconduct under HAMP see no meaningful
difference between the two.15 5 This is particularly true in adjudicating
motions to dismiss in which plaintiffs' allegations of misconduct flow
from purported failure of servicers to comply with terms and
conditions imposed by HAMP, and are, therefore, not seen as
sufficiently separate and independent of HAMP to state a separate
state law cause of action.156 Relying heavily on the Seventh Circuit
case Ocwen Loan Servicing Mortgage Servicing Litigation, the court

in Wigod defined non-preempted "conventional" state law claims as
those applying to "basic norms" of business conduct that traditionally
undergird "commercial transactions" subject to common law standards
of duty of care, even if the regulatory standards governing the
operations of the mortgage servicing industry are established by the
preempting federal statute.' 57
According to the Wigod Court, Ocwen is instructive in how
federally-related HAMP claims are distinguishable from purely statebased common law claims.' 5 8 Ocwen emphasized that the "plenary
regulatory authority" of federal agencies, such as Treasury, are not
given exclusive "power to adjudicate disputes between [banks] and

Wigod, 673 F.3d at 576-581.
See Vida v. OneWest Bank, Civ. No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, *5
(D. Ore. Dec. 13, 2010) ("Vida's essential argument is this: although her breach of
contract claim is premised on representations made in the course of the HAMP
approval process and, to some extent, on representations made in HAMP documents
themselves, it is not premised on an entitlement arising under HAMP, and, thus, does
not depend on a private right of action also arising under HAMP. Rather, the claim
depends on representations made by OneWest which themselves amounted to an
enforceable promise to modify her contract and refrain from initiating foreclosure.").
156 Id. (Although [servicers] are not immunized for their conduct simply
because the transaction is associated with HAMP, "the facts and allegations as
pleaded [by borrowers] in this case are premised chiefly on the terms and procedures
set forth via HAMP and are not sufficiently independent to state a separate state law
cause of action for breach of contract.").
117 Wigod, 673 F.3d at 578, citing Ocwen Loan Serv. Mortg. Serv. Litigation,
491 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir. 2007).
154

1"

158 Id.
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their customers";1 59 nor do preemptive federal bank statutes "deprive
persons harmed by the wrongful acts of [banks] of their basic state
common-law-type remedies."' 60 Wigod quotes Ocwen directly:
Suppose an S & L signs a mortgage agreement with a
homeowner that specifies an annual interest rate of 6
percent and a year later bills the homeowner at a rate of
10 percent and when the homeowner refuses to pay
institutes foreclosure proceedings. It would be
surprising for a federal regulation to forbid the
homeowner's state to give the homeowner a defense
based on the mortgagee's breach of contract. Or if the
[servicer]... fraudulently represents to the mortgagor
that it will forgive a default, and then forecloses, it
would be surprising for a federal regulation to bar a suit
for fraud.... Enforcement of state law in either of the
mortgage-servicing examples above would complement
rather than substitute for the federal regulatory

scheme.161
Drawing on Ocwen and applying traditional doctrines of conflict
and field preemption, the court in Wigod distinguishes state-based
common law claims asserting "conventional" misrepresentation and
breach of contract in connection with the HAMP loan modification
process from those claims that would impose substantive state-law
duties on mortgage servicers inconsistent or in conflict with HAMP, or
which impose duties beyond those already required by HAMP.1 62 The
Wigod court refused to dismiss plaintiffs common law contract claim
that the servicer breached its written promise to permanently modify
the loan if she complied with the HAMP trial modification (TPP),
noting that the defendant's common law duty does not create
159 Ocwen Loan Serv. Mortg. Serv. Litigation, 491 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir.

2007).

160 Wigod, 673
161Id., quoting

F.3d at 577, quoting Ocwen, 491. F.3d at 643.
Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643-44 (emphasis supplied).
162 Id. at 578, citing Ocwen, 492 F.3d at 644-46 ("In our attempt
to untangle
in that case the complaint's 'gallimaufry' of alleged 'skull-duggery,' we
distinguished claims asserting 'conventional' misrepresentation or breach of contract
(which were not preempted) from those that would have effectively imposed statelaw rules governing mortgage servicing and thereby 'interfere[d] with federal
regulation of disclosure, fees, and credit terms' (which were preempted.").
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obligations beyond those already imposed by HAMP.163 In essence,
then, although the purported failure of the servicer to offer a
permanent modification after the plaintiff fulfilled the conditions
precedent contained in the TPP was done under the rubric of the
federally-created HAMP program, the breach of contract claims are of
the conventional common law variety applicable to the "basic norms"
of personal conduct in commercial transactions traditionally regulated
by state law.1 64 According to Wigod's application of the federal
preemption doctrine, these state-based common law duties are fully
consistent with what HAMP already requires of servicers - offering
permanent modifications upon full compliance with the TPP.165 That
is, the state law duties neither conflict with nor create additional
obligations beyond those already required by HAMP.16 6
Hence, where pure state law claims of alleged HAMP servicer
misconduct are pled, Wigod renders inapplicable EESA's bar on
borrower private causes of actions against servicers for purported
HAMP violations. In doing so, Wigod avoids the Rule 12(b)(6)
pitfalls of bringing HAMP causes of action premised on theories of
third-party beneficiary 167 or constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest. 168 By applying state-based common law claims to
alleged servicer misconduct arising under the federally-created HAMP
program, Wigod gives aggrieved borrowers recourse for challenging
purportedly improper loan modification denials.' 69

Id. at 578-79 (rejecting servicer's contention that subjecting it to common
law claims "would necessarily establish new standards for servicers' customer
relation policies" because they do "not create state-law duties for servicing home
mortgages, let alone ones that 'actually conflict' with federal standards").
164 Id. at 577.
165 Id. at 578-79.
161

166

Id.

Marks v. Bank of America, No. 03:10-civ-08039, 2010 WL 2572988 (D.
Ariz. June 22, 2010).
168 Williams v. Geithner, No. 09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 WL 3757380 (D.
Minn. 2009).
169 See, e.g., Corvello v. Wells Fargo, 728 F.3d 878 ( 9 th Cir. 2013), which
relied on Wigod to uphold borrower's state-based common law claims for purported
breach of contract by servicer to offer a permanent HAMP modification upon
borrower compliance with the TPP.
167
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However, Wigod alone will do little to systemically stem the tide
of foreclosures that Congress had in mind when it enacted EESA.' 7 0
Equally important, Wigod's impact is strictly limited to those precise
factual circumstances where, as in Wigod, the servicer's alleged breach
of contract to offer a permanent modification is conditioned on the
borrower's compliance with the TPP and where, in fact, the borrower
does so comply.171 The fact pattern in many HAMP cases may not be
as clear cut as in Wigod, and judges may be reluctant to find breach of
contract when conditional offers made by servicers to homeowners
under HAMP are susceptible to more than one interpretation.172
Indeed, applying Wigod on a wider scale ultimately depends on
whether other circuits construe the wording of HAMP TPPs as
obligating the servicer to offer a permanent modification upon
Moreover, invoking Wigod
borrower's full TPP compliance.'
to
discern the subtle difference
are
able
courts
whether
on
depends
between when servicer conduct directly related to HAMP obligations
ends and a servicer's pure common law duty begins. That threshold
distinction is critical to determining whether a purported breach of a
HAMP loan modification is inextricably linked to a federal HAMP
obligation, and thus barred by EESA, or linked to "basic norms" of
personal conduct in commercial transactions traditionally regulated by
state common law, and thus allowed to go to trial. 174
12 U.S.C. § 5219; see also, S. Rep. No. 110-514, at 2 (2008) ("The core of
the current economic crisis is the record high level of foreclosures. Until the
foreclosure crisis is addressed, our economy will not recover.").
171 Corvello, 728 F.3d 878.
172 See Pennington v. HSBC Bank USA, 493 Fed.Appx. 548 (5th Cir. 2012)
and Miller v. Chase Home Finance, 677 F.3d 1113 (11 th Cir. 2012), both holding
that the TPP did not commit the servicer to offering a permanent modification upon
borrower compliance with the TPP.
in See Pennington v. HSBC Bank USA, 493 Fed.Appx. 548 (5th Cir. 2012)
(holding that because the TPP clearly provides that no modification will result until
the servicer sends a permanent modification agreement to the borrower that is signed
by the servicer, there is no breach of contract even if the borrower otherwise
complies with the terms of the TPP). Wigod found that this particular language in the
TPP afforded servicers too much discretion, thus rendering the contract illusory.
Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 568 (7th Cir. 2012). Without
mentioning Wigod, the Eleventh Circuit found no contractual breach by the servicer
on the grounds that the TPP did not promise a permanent modification, "only that it
would temporarily modify the terms of his loan." Miller v. Chase Home Finance,
677 F.3d at 1117.
174 For example, in Vida v. OneWest Bank, Civ. No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL
5148473, *5 (D. Ore. Dec. 13, 2010), the court found allegations of common law
170
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In sum, a combination of factors served to circumvent
congressional efforts to comprehensively address the impact of the
U.S. foreclosure crisis. However, at root, Treasury failed to design or
enforce HAMP in a manner adequate to overcome the inherent,
structural barriers to loan modification created by the modem system
of securitized real estate finance. As a consequence of Treasury's
ineffective program design and enforcement, along with the lack of
standing for aggrieved HAMP applicants to enforce compliance with
what they perceive as servicers' mandatory contractual obligations
under HAMP, efforts to systemically alleviate the foreclosure crisis
through enhanced loan modification remains elusive.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS

This Note has attempted to show that that the root cause of
HAMP's failure is the unwillingness of the Treasury Department to
design and enforce the program that fully accounts for misaligned
incentives among investors, servicers, and borrowers in the
contemporary system of real estate mortgage finance. Nevertheless,
HAMP's shortcomings cannot be exclusively blamed on Congress, the
Treasury Department, or even those courts quick to ratify questionable
application of the federal preemption doctrine that blocks borrowers'
ability to seek judicial recourse. Rather, servicer behavior is a direct
product of the securitized system of real estate mortgage finance that
policy makers widely support for the purpose of creating lending
capital needed for the important goal of increased homeownership.1 7
breach of contract for servicer's failure to offer a permanent HAMP loan
indistinguishable from the servicer's discretionary obligations under HAMP.
According to the court, because the allegations "are premised chiefly on the terms
and procedures set forth via HAMP," they "are not sufficiently independent to state a
separate state law cause of action for breach of contract."
' See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1723a, stating, among other things, that the purpose of
Fannie Mae is to pursue the goal of affordable housing in the U.S. In recognition of
the daunting task faced by Treasury in designing a federal foreclosure relief program
within the confines of the modem securitized system of real estate finance, Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner in 2010 rejected a legislative proposal premised on the
New Deal's Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) initiative, which authorized
the federal government to purchase distressed mortgages directly from struggling
homeowners and banks holding underwater mortgages. Secretary Geithner indicated
that purchasing mortgages directly from "trusts and other securitization vehicles that
own or control a substantial share of mortgage debt" constitutes a "barrier to
potential success" of the proposed legislation, in part because contemporary
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To properly address the foreclosure crisis, Congress must instead
adopt a more comprehensive solution directly addressing
securitization's perverse incentive structure that gives servicers
disproportionate influence in the loan modification process.
Specifically, Congress should consider targeted reforms that
transfer decision-making authority over the loan modification process
from self-interested servicers to the hands of neutral third-party
experts with no financial or personal stake in the outcome of loan
modification decisions.176 Two viable proposals have recently been
identified. First, in testimony before Congress in November 2010,
Georgetown Law Professor Adam J. Levitin presented a proposal that
would remove servicers from the loan modification process altogether
and create a dedicated foreclosure/loan modification tribunal overseen
by federal judges. 7 7 These judges would weigh the interests of at-risk
homeowners, mortgage investors, and loan servicers, all of whom have
a financial stake in the matter much the same as creditors do in
bankruptcy proceedings.1 7 8 Rather than go through the cumbersome
HAMP approach of trial modification-to-permanent modification, or to
fully litigate those modification determinations in court, the Levitin
proposal would expedite the determination of whether foreclosure can
be averted, and promote measures to minimize financial losses to
investors and homeowners alike.179 Further, this approach has the
added benefit of addressing conditions that gave rise to the robosigning scandal by using the court's authority to quiet the title of
securitized properties. 0 The court would also oversee the
restructuring of bank and investor-held loan portfolios, including
authority to write off distressed loans.18

"accounting and regulatory requirements" that did not exist at the time of the original
Home Owners Loan Corporation program was implemented. See Letter from
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to Rep. Brad Miller, Member, U.S. House of
Representatives, May 7, 2010 (on file with the author).
176 See notes 177 to 185 and accompanying text, infra.
177 Testimony of Adam Levitin, Hearings Before the Committee of Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, I 11th Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Hrg. 111-987,
p. 37-39, 120 (this legislative proposal would add a new chapter to the bankruptcy
code).
1 Id.
179

Id.

180 Id.
181 Id.
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Additionally, in 2009, legislation called the "Mortgage and
Securities Stabilization, Recovery and Modification Program Act of
2009" was drafted by Yale Economics Professor John D. Geanakoplos
and former Boston University Law Professor Susan P. Koniak.182 The
legislation would create a dedicated loan modification program under
which the decision-making process would be transferred from
servicers to government-appointed trustees made up of community
bankers and other housing experts in the geographic region where the
at-risk homeowner lives.' 8 3 Unlike the Levitin proposal, which would
allow stakeholders to represent themselves before a judicial tribunal,
under the so-called Blind Trustee proposal, third-party experts would
review the loan with no knowledge of the respective servicer, investor,
or borrower.184
Although insulating decision-makers
from
stakeholders would enhance neutrality of the decision-making process,
failure to consult affected stakeholders may undermine the initiative's
political support and legitimacy and result in uninformed decisions
that adversely affect stakeholders.
Both the Foreclosure Triage and Blind Trustee proposals might
pick up support from servicers, who have become increasingly wary of
having to invest millions of dollars into loan modification processes
that expose them to greater litigation exposure as a result of the
foreclosure crisis. 185
CONCLUSION

The complex and fragmented system of securitized mortgage
finance not only helped produce the housing crisis of the 2000s, but
served to undermine congressional efforts to efficiently and equitably
mitigate its worst effects without causing excessive damage to the
financial interests of investors, homeowners, and servicers. The Blind
Trust and Foreclosure Triage proposals are helpful starting points in
182

David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation
Principlein State PropertyLaw, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 107-08 (Winter 2010).
183id.
184

Id.

185Testimony

of Adam Levitin, supra note 175, at 37 (noting that because the
securitized system of residential mortgage finance originally envisioned servicers as
mere transaction processors on behalf of investors in a rapidly growing housing
market, and not as specialists dedicated to negotiating workouts with distressed
homeowners during the housing crash, servicers cannot be expected to be effective
or successful in that line of business).
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crafting policy alternatives that would achieve the goals of facilitating
loan modifications while adhering to the parameters of the
securitization paradigm.
This Note also offers a painful lesson on the importance of clarity
in legislative drafting to ensure that statutory objectives are clearly
communicated and that congressional intent is properly carried out by
the responsible agencies. As many as four million at-risk homeowners
were promised a chance to have their loans objectively analyzed to
determine whether they might be saved from the humiliating
experience of foreclosure and dislocation. Instead, Treasury designed
an "ineffectual federal program"1 8 6 that ignored structural imbalance
in the modern system of real estate finance. As a result, HAMP fell far
short of meeting Congress' goal to comprehensively address the
foreclosure crisis that continues to afflict America's economy today.

Rivera v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 09 CV 2450 LB, 2011
WL 1533474,
1 (E.D.N.Y. April 21, 2011).
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